LANDSCAPES, MINDSCAPES, AND REFLECTIVE PRACTICE IN SUPERVISION

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It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way—in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only—Charles Dickens

What is the present landscape in supervision and teaching really like? To what extent do the theories of scholars and prescriptions of practicing supervisors reflect this landscape? How congruent are mindscapes of supervision and teaching with the actual world of teaching practice?

Recently several practicing school supervisors were asked by the editor of their state Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development journal to comment on problems they encountered in practice and their attempts to resolve these problems. The supervisors spoke of supervision as being a “pro forma task,” an obstacle to improvement, as being formal and artificial, detached and impersonal, and too hierarchical. They complained that teachers don’t think rationally enough, don’t plan, are not responsive to criticism, and are unable to see reality. But when proposing solutions to these problems, the supervisors stayed “close to home” by relying on familiar prescriptions for practice and widely accepted theoretical frames of reference. Essentially, they emphasized doing better that which they had been doing, trying harder to apply the same supervisory rationales and techniques with which they were familiar, and asserting more intensely the same basic assumptions, characteristics, and designs that presently exist for their supervisory practice.

The supervisors were correct, I believe, in identifying the shortcomings of present practice. They went astray, however, by relying on the same intellectual frames of reference in seeking to improve practice. Supervision will not improve very much by doing better that which we are now doing. Basic

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1See forthcoming issue of Impact on Instructional Improvement (Albany: New York State Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, in press)
knowledge perspectives will need to be changed before practices will change enough to make a difference, and this is the difficult reality that we face.

The crux of the problem is that the dominant mindscapes for supervision do not reflect the reality of supervisory practice. Mindscapes are implicit mental frames through which supervisory reality and our place in this reality are envisioned. Mindscapes provide us with intellectual and psychological images of the real world and the boundaries and parameters of rationality that help us to make sense of this world. In a very special way, mindscapes are intellectual security blankets on the one hand and road maps through an uncertain world on the other. As road maps they provide the rules, assumptions, images, and practice exemplars that define for us what supervision is and how it should unfold. Mindscapes program our thinking and belief structure as to what should be included in supervision, and thus they possess such features as ideology and dogmatism. They also provide us with frames for deciding what should not be included in our thinking and what practices should not be included. So complete is the programming of a mindscapes that its assumptions and practices are automatically accepted and articulated. Mindscapes are not thought about very much, for they are assumed to be true. Thus when a supervisory mindscapes does not fit the world of practice, the problem is assumed to be in that world. Rarely is the world accepted for what it is and the prevailing mindscapes challenged or indeed abandoned in favor of others.

THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL MINDSCAPES

In this article theoretical and practical perspectives are portrayed as competing supervisory mindscapes. The present supervisory landscape is a creation of the theoretical mindscapes. Despite its dominance, the theoretical perspective does not fit the realities of professional practice in supervision. By contrast, the concept of "reflective practice" is proposed as a more practical mindscapes—one better able to account for the realities of supervision and to inform professional practice.

At issue is how one should view supervisory inquiry and practice. How should problems be framed? How should inquiry proceed? What is worth studying? And how should defective practice be defined? The theoretical perspective on supervision answers these questions quite differently than does the practical. The theoretical perspective seeks to establish a true rendering of what is. This perspective is measurement-oriented, and within it precision, reliability, and objectivity are presumed to be of most importance.

Let us take, for example, the process of evaluating teachers and teaching. When evaluating from within the theoretical perspective, the following questions are considered to be key. What exactly is going on in this classroom? How can I document this reality objectively and reliably? What is the worth of these findings against some standard? How can I link what the teacher does to these findings with objectivity and confidence? Is the teacher excellent,
good, fair, or poor on given dimensions, and can I back up my assertions with concrete evidence? Despite its quest for truth, the theoretical perspective is able to reveal truth only within the limits of how its subject matter is conceived. Decisions as to how to evaluate teaching, for example, influence the outcome of the evaluation. These decisions include methods used to collect information and standards against which measurements will be compared.

A practical perspective in supervision and evaluation is dynamic and expansive. In contrast to a theoretical perspective, the practical is holistic and seeks to make sense of classroom events, to explain and understand what is going on. Its purpose is not to establish truth in a "traditional scientific" sense, but to be helpful and to encourage meaningful change. Change occurs when events of the world make sense to people. Further, a practical perspective is decision-oriented. As a result of supervision, something is intended to happen to teaching. Instead of seeking to establish truth in some abstract way, a practical perspective seeks to create doubt, raise issues, and discover reality in teaching. Unlike the emphasis on "brute" data, which dominates the theoretical perspective, "sense" data and sensible information are sought. Reality, within the practical perspective, is not something that exists separate from supervisor and teacher but is constructed and created by them. Thus external measurement rods are not viewed as key elements of the evaluation process. Instead, internal matters are important, and the evaluation is constructed from actual classroom events as perceived by students, supervisors, and teachers.

MINDSCAPES, METAPHORS, AND ACTION

Theoretical and practical mindscapes are expressed through the language systems we use, which, in turn, reinforce our mindscapes. A person's view of supervision and evaluation does not exist separate from her or his view of teaching, the nature of power and authority, and how knowledge in supervision is generated and used. Views of supervision and evaluation are typically revealed in the language systems that supervisors use. Language frames our thinking by focusing attention on some aspects of a supervisory problem and by excluding others.

Metaphors are powerful exemplars of language, which influence the framing of supervisory problems. Framing is a defining process and thus, through the use of metaphor, problems are defined in a particular way. Other metaphors would define these very same problems differently. Problem reality is little more than a function of this framing process. Framing reinforces the supervisory mindscapes of the framer and influences the creation of this scape in the minds of others. Once a problem is framed within a given supervisory mindscope, those involved in analyzing this problem are locked into a partic-

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ular way of thinking and forced into a particular course of action. This thinking and action is then justified in terms of the original mindscape. As Greenfield reminds us, "Language is Power. It literally makes reality appear and disappear. Those who control language control thought—and thereby themselves and others. We build categories to dominate the world and its organization." 3

How one views teaching influences her or his supervisory mindscape. Within the theoretical perspective, the pipeline or conduit metaphor is often used to depict teaching. "Instructional delivery systems" are conceived as pipelines through which knowledge and information must travel. 4 Student outcomes are at one end of this line, teaching inputs at the other end. Care must be taken to keep this instructional pipeline flowing smoothly, obstructions in the line must be eliminated, and the line itself must be shaped to avoid blockage kinks. Inputs must be properly sized to fit the pipeline, and a system of monitoring must be established to ensure easy movement of this input through the line. Student outcomes need to be carefully checked to ensure that they fit input intents. Improvements need to be made in the composition and arrangement of the pipeline itself in an effort to maximize even further student outcomes at lowest cost, and so on.

Conceiving of teaching as an instructional design system pipeline provides a highly instrumental view that frames and shapes the way schooling is and is not to be understood. Students are cast into receptive roles. Persons at the input end of the pipeline make calculated decisions about teaching and learning. The pipeline itself is viewed in a mechanical sense. It is hard not to conceive of teaching and learning in another way—we become trapped by the mindscape from which the pipeline metaphor emerges, and it programs our thinking and actions. Once this teaching mindscape is fixed, it determines the way supervision is likely to occur.

Madeline Hunter’s work provides a fairly clear-cut example of how minds- capes program thinking and determine action. She prescribes a specific method of supervision, which stems from her conception of teaching and learning. She views teaching and learning as an instructional delivery system, and the pipeline metaphor fits her mindscape very well. Consider the highly instrumental language she uses to describe teaching and learning and particularly the pipeline imagery projected.

Teaching, as it is used in this chapter, is defined as the constant stream of professional decisions that affect the probability of learning. Only recently, however, has research in learning been translated into cause-effect relationships of use to teachers. Teaching involves factor-analyzing those goals into dependent sequences of learning, diagnosing students to determine what each has achieved in that sequence, and employing psychological principles that contribute to the speed and effectiveness with which each student acquires new learnings in these sequences.

Teaching is an applied science derived from research and human learning and human behavior. An applied science that utilizes the findings of psychology, neurology, sociology, and anthropology.

The science of teaching is based on cause-effect relationships existing in three categories of decisions that all teachers make.

The teacher determines the vocabulary loading and idea density that each student is able to handle successfully and the degree of imbedding or surfacing of the information that is necessary to make its location challenging but visible to the learner.

The teacher must ascertain whether the learning behavior "input system" being utilized is working for that student. If it isn't working, another learning behavior needs to be added or substituted for the less successful one.

The teacher must have task-analyzed the final objective to identify knowledge and skills that need to be acquired. Only then can the input phase of the lesson be designed so that a successful outcome becomes predictable.

Students practice their new knowledge or skill under direct teacher supervision. New learning is like wet cement, it is easily damaged. An error at the beginning of learning can easily "set" so that it is harder to eradicate than had it been eradicated immediately.

Accepting Hunter's teaching and learning mindscape influences the way supervision is likely to unfold. An interaction exists between one's view of teaching and learning and of supervision and evaluation with each framing and influencing the other.

Hunter states, for example, "Most principals were effective teachers, but their skills may have been intuitive and therefore inarticulate." To remedy this problem and to set the stage for implementation of the prescribed supervisory strategy, she maintains that principals (supervisors) must possess a certain and common body of knowledge, essentially the nuts and bolts of her mindscape for teaching and learning.

THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE IN SUPERVISION

One's view of the nature of knowledge, how it is generated and how it is used in practice, is an additional determiner of one's supervisory mindscape. Within the theoretical mindscape it is assumed that supervisory knowledge.
shares characteristics common to all scientific knowledge. This assumption is consistent with Comte's search for a "unity of science," which would treat social objects and the cultural world in the same way physical objects are treated in the natural sciences. Inquiry in the social world, according to the "unity of science" view, would exclude prior knowledge, implicit knowledge, and tacit knowing (intuition of and personal meanings for supervisors, teachers, and students), require absolute separation between the knower (supervisor or teacher) and the object known (teaching), assume that social objects and social reality (such as teaching), like physical objects and physical reality, have an existence independent of the observer, require that social inquiry (supervision and evaluation) be a neutral activity, an objective process void of bias, emphasize what is (the facts of teaching) rather than what should be, require that teaching, supervision, and evaluation develop their own languages (as contrasted with lay persons' vernacular in order to adequately and universally discuss social reality, and require the development of unique methods of inquiry (as contrasted from common sense or everyday approaches to knowing) in order to discover true reality.

Knowledge itself within the theoretical perspective is hierarchical and therefore generated downward in the form of a linear chain. This chain and its relationship to Hunter's model of teaching and supervision is depicted in Figure 1.

Within the theoretical perspective supervision is viewed as an "applied science." This phrase is itself a metaphor that frames our thinking and shapes our actions. Applied science flows from basic science as embodied in key underlying disciplines such as psychology, neurology, sociology, and anthropology, according to Hunter, and uses this scientific knowledge to build practice models and standard practice treatments. At the bottom of this hierarchy (perhaps a metaphor suggesting that it is the least important part of the knowledge hierarchy?) is a professional practice component whereby knowledge flowing from the top is applied in performing services to clients.

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*A number of individuals have urged that supervision and teaching be viewed as more artistic than scientific. See Daniel C. Lortie, School Teacher: A Sociological Study (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), Philip Jackson, Life in Classrooms (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968), Elliot W. Eisner, The Educational Imagination, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1985). The artistic metaphor represents an entirely different mindset of teaching and supervision, one that frames issues of importance and decisions and actions of professionals into lanes quite different than does the theoretical mindset. Artistic mindscapes and accompanying metaphors work similarly to other mindscapes by framing thinking about teaching and learning and thus programming action. Educational mindscapes create professional reality, and realities for persons differ as their mindscapes differ. The worth of a particular supervisory reality is determined by its usefulness in reflecting the world of teachers and their work, in promoting understanding of this world, and in improving professional practice."
THE NATURE OF PRACTICE IN SUPERVISION

I began with the assertion that the present theoretical basis (mindscape) for supervision provides an unrealistic view of supervision and for this reason may not be useful for guiding practice. Within this mindscape supervision and evaluation are viewed as logical processes that seek to establish objective truth. They rely heavily on action strategies based on universal principles, linear thinking, and logical analysis. They assume that the worlds of supervision and evaluation are characterized by stability and uniformity of problems. Given these conditions, they seek to provide standard practice prescriptions (instructions, steps, treatments, processes) to supervisors.

In practice, supervision and evaluation differ markedly from this theoretical view. Patterns of practice are actually characterized by a great deal of uncertainty, instability, complexity, and variety. Value conflicts and uniqueness are accepted aspects of educational settings. These characteristics are, according to Schon, perceived as central to the world of professional practice in all of the major professions (medicine, engineering, management, education). And because of these characteristics, Schon concludes, "Professional knowledge is mismatched to the changing characteristics of the situations of practice." Though one may be comfortable in viewing supervision as a logical process of problem solving, a more accurate view may be as a process of "managing messes."

In reality, the task of the supervisor is to make sense of messy situations by increasing understanding and discovering and communicating meaning. Since situations of practice are characterized by unique events, uniform answers to problems are not likely to be helpful. Since teachers, supervisors, and students bring to the classroom beliefs, assumptions, values, opinions, preferences, and predispositions, objective and value-free supervisory strategies are not likely to address issues of importance. Since uncertainty and com-

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10Ibid. p 16
plexity are normal aspects in the process of teaching, intuition becomes necessary to fill in between the gaps of what can be specified as known. Since reality in practice does not exist separate from persons involved in the process of teaching and supervising, knowing cannot be separated from what is to be known. Since evaluation reality is linked to the observer and to decisions she or he makes about methods of observation, it is constructed as an artifact of the situation. Since supervisory messes are context bound and situationally determined, the language of actual classroom life and actual teaching events will be listened to rather than the theoretical language or language that may be inherent in rating scales and other measurement devices.

THE CLINICAL MIND IN SUPERVISION AND TEACHING

The crux of the mismatch between professional knowledge perceived as theoretical and the actual context and practice of supervision is that teachers operate in a clinical rather than theoretical mode.

Don Hogben, for example, maintains that teachers and other professional practitioners view their work quite differently than do theoreticians or researchers. They have, he concludes, a different world view. He draws his conclusions from Freidson's extensive examination of the profession of medicine and accepts for teachers Freidson's concept of "clinical mentality." That is, professionals are possessed by a clinical mentality that provides them with a mindscape of work at odds with the theoretical mindscape.

In comparing clinically minded medical professionals with medical researchers and theoreticians, Freidson, according to Hogben, identifies four major differences. First, professionals aim at action not at knowledge. Doing something, indeed anything, is always preferable to doing nothing. As they practice, teachers and supervisors are more likely to take action when faced with a problem they don't understand very well than to wait for theory and research to unravel the problem. They prefer action over inaction even when such action has little chance of success. In this action process, supervisors and teachers are more likely to seek useful than truthful knowledge and to engage in a process of understanding-seeking rather than truth-seeking. Useful knowledge and increased understanding are prized because they support action.

Suggesting that useful knowledge is more important than truthful knowledge requires some explanation. Professionals view themselves as "truth-makers" rather than "truth-seekers." As Noblit explains, truth-makers are engaged in "originative" acts as they create the social worlds within which they live. Truth-seekers, on the other hand, are about the business of finding that which already exists. Noblit quotes Shackle as follows:

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There are truth-seekers and truth-makers. On the one hand, the pure scientist deems himself to be typically faced with a problem which has one right answer. His business is, in the map-maker’s language, to get a fix on that problem, to take bearings from opposite ends of a base-line and plot them to converge upon the solution, the truth to-be-found. On the other hand, the poet-architect-adventurer sees before him a landscape inexhaustibly rich in suggestions and materials for making things, for making works of literature or art or technology, for making policies and history itself, or perhaps for making the complex, delicate, existential system called a business."

Certainly “truth” does exist and it is of great interest to professionals, when they can use it, as a basis for determining courses of action. Within the medical specialty of ophthalmology, as an example, it is estimated that 80 percent of the cases of patient complaints do not fall into the available standard categories of diagnosis or treatment. Physicians are grateful for occasions when standard treatment repertoires do fit the problems they face, but they must take action nonetheless in the vast majority of other cases. By taking action they seek to make sense of the problems they face and to create knowledge in use. Their clinical mentality casts them into the role of “truth-maker” rather than “truth-finder” or applier of known truths. Understanding and knowledge usefulness are important in truth-making.

A truth-seeking approach to supervision seeks to establish and define a single concept of “good” teaching to be used as a standard for developing and applying measurement tools to determine the extent to which good teaching exists in various settings of interest. Despite exaggerated claims to the contrary, a single concept of good teaching cannot be established empirically, and such a concept cannot exist in an absolute sense. Indeed different versions of good teaching exist, each depending upon a different world view, different interests, and different purposes. It is possible to agree on a version of good teaching. This agreement would not depend so much on facts or empirically established reality but upon a process of justification. Justification, in turn, is a product of our values and interests.

The second characteristic of the clinical mind, which Freidson found in his comparison of medical practitioners with researchers and theoreticians, was that professionals need to believe in what they are doing as they practice. They need to believe that professional action does more good than harm and that they are effective in solving problems and in serving clients. Teachers, Hogben concludes, "must strongly believe in what they are doing, because their daily practices and decisions are rarely followed by pupil improvement.

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13 Establishing a single concept of “good” teaching and empirically validating a particular teaching technique (or series of techniques) are not the same. Techniques masterfully articulated but misapplied in a given situation or for a given purpose would, in reality, be examples of “bad” teaching.
which can be tied unequivocally to those practices and decisions. This comment applies as well to supervisors, for they too have precious little with which they can judge their effectiveness. Theoretical mindscapes encourage detachment and healthy skepticism. By contrast, the world of practice is characterized by close attachment and a commitment to one's course of action.

The third characteristic identified by Freidson is the heavy reliance of professionals on their own firsthand experience and on the experience of other professionals with whom they work in similar settings. They rely more on results than theory, and trust their own accumulated experiences in making decisions about practice than they do abstract principles. In describing teachers, Hogben points out that "they may adopt the rhetoric and the slogans emanating from educational psychology, sociology and the rest as it suits them, but their day-to-day practice often runs counter to theoretical dictates." It is not surprising, therefore, that researchers such as Emil Haller and Charles Keenan found that teachers rely primarily on other teachers as sources of new ideas and for help in solving existing problems. Further, "other teachers" were viewed as the most reliable sources of help and new ideas.

The final difference revealed by Freidson's comparison, according to Hogben, is that "... the practitioner is very prone to emphasize the idea of indeterminancy or uncertainty, not the idea of regularity of lawful, scientific behavior," which characterizes the theoretical mindspace. The issue may be less whether professionals want to emphasize uncertainty than that they must. In medicine, for example, a recent review of the research reveals that only about 15 percent of medical procedures in common use are validated by scientific studies. The figure in education would be even less. How incongruous it would be to ignore the complexities of the problems faced in schools and the infallibility of the scientific base for teaching by abandoning indeterminancy and uncertainty in favor of three major decisions, seven major steps, and six major types, or of other "scientific" prescriptions that seek "regularity" and "lawfulness" in practice.

In sum, "the clinical mind stresses action rather than knowledge; belief in action, reliance on personal experience and 'results,' rather than on theory,
abstract principles or 'book knowledge.' And, finally, there is an emphasis on indeterminancy rather than a commitment to the idea of regularity of behavior.19 These characteristics of the clinical mind, taken together with the reality that patterns of practice are characterized by a great deal of uncertainty, instability, and complexity, and the reality that value conflicts and uniqueness are accepted aspects of educational settings suggest that theoretical mindscapes of supervision and teaching do not adequately reflect the condition of practice. They do not yield enough useful knowledge to professionals, and, when conceived as the basis for an applied science of supervision and teaching, they are weak constructs for the improvement of practice.

SUPERVISION AS REFLECTION-IN-ACTION

Practical mindscapes have the potential for yielding professional knowledge, which promotes understanding, is useful in solving problems, and guides professional action. Unlike theoretical knowledge, which emerges from a downward flow, professional knowledge is created in use as professionals, faced with ill-defined, unique, and constantly changing problems, decide courses of action.

Ralph Tyler maintains that researchers don't have a full understanding of the nature of professional knowledge in education. He states:

Researchers and many academics also misunderstand educational practices. The practice of every profession evolves informally, and professional procedures are not generally derived from a systematic design based on research finding. Professional practice has largely developed through trial and error and intuitive efforts. Practitioners, over the years, discover procedures that appear to work and others that fail. The professional practice of teaching, as well as that of law, medicine, and theology, is largely a product of the experience of practitioners, particularly those who are more creative, inventive, and observant than the average.20

Scientific studies in the various professions are important. But science, according to Tyler, "explains phenomenon, it does not produce practices." Professionals rely heavily on informed intuition as they create knowledge in use. Intuition is informed by theoretical knowledge on the one hand and by interacting with the context of practice on the other. When teachers use informed intuition, they are engaging in reflective practice. When supervisors use informed intuition, they too are engaging in reflective practice. Knowing is in the action itself, and reflective professionals (teachers and supervisors) become students of their practice. They research the context and experiment with different courses of action. As Schon suggests.

19Donald Hogben, "The Clinical Mind Some Implications for Educational Research and Teacher Training" (Urbana-Champaign Center for Instructional Research and Curriculum Evaluation, University of Illinois, undated), p. 11
They may ask themselves, for example, "What features do I notice when I recognize this thing? What are the criteria by which I make this judgment? What procedures am I enacting when I perform this skill? How am I framing the problem that I'm trying to solve?" Usually, reflection on knowing-in-action goes together with reflection on the stuff at hand. There is some puzzling, or troubling, or interesting phenomenon with which the individual is trying to deal. As he tries to make sense of it, he also reflects on the understandings which have been implicit in his action, understandings which he surfaces, criticizes, re-structures, and embodies in further action.

It is this entire process of reflection-in-action which is central to the "art" by which practitioners sometimes deal well with situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict.

To Schon, reflection-in-action involves "on-the-spot surfacing, criticizing, re-structuring, and testing of intuitive understandings of experienced phenomena; often, it takes the form of a reflective conversation with the situation." Reflection-in-action captures the clinical mind at work as teachers plan lessons, analyze problems, and decide on courses of action in teaching. Reflection-in-action captures, as well, the supervisor at work as she or he makes judgments in an attempt to manage a very messy work context. What is missing in both cases is reflection on the process of reflection-in-action.

Theoretical mindscapes reflect the concept of applied science, and this concept in practice requires far less reflection-in-action than first seems apparent. In applied science, problems are diagnosed for fit with standard practice treatments, and the "correct" one is selected for application. In reflective practice, knowledge is created in use as professionals explore and experiment. They rely less on standard treatments and more on informed intuition to create tailored "treatments."

With respect to supervisory practice as an applied science, teachers are expected to place themselves in the hands of a supervisor and rely on this person's wisdom in properly analyzing teaching problems and prescribing treatments for improvement. Supervision as reflective practice, however, requires that teachers join supervisors in trying to make sense of complex situations, in sharing perceptions, and in arriving at "treatments" and other courses of action together. The teacher is not dependent upon the supervisor. Instead, the supervisor needs the teacher's involvement in order to fully understand what is going on.

Applied science in supervision seeks to establish a body of artificial professional intelligence. Theoretical knowledge would be the key aspect of such intelligence. Supervisors would merely have to "diagnose" problems they face and draw from this intelligence standard treatments to apply. By contrast, reflective practice seeks to establish augmented professional intel-

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ligence. Supervisors themselves would be key aspects of this intelligence, for it would not stand apart as an abstract body of theoretical knowledge. Augmented professional intelligence serves to inform the intuitions of supervisors as they practice. As this process unfolds, practical knowledge is created in use as unique "treatments" are developed, applied, refined, and shared with other supervisors.

The concept of reflective practice in supervision poses many other issues not examined in this article. The mindscape issue, however, is fundamental. Theoretical mindscapes of supervision favor abstract views and deterministic prescriptions that do not reflect the actual world of supervision and therefore are not very useful in and of themselves. The question is, do we persist in pursuing and refining theoretical mindscapes, or do we abandon them in favor of more practical and useful ones? Choosing the latter course has its challenges and will require us to "shake loose" from a comfortable present. But if we want to develop a useful practice of supervision, then this is the course we must follow. I choose "the spring of hope" over "the winter of despair."

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